

**Institutional Designs for Diverse Democracies: Consociationalism, Centripetalism
and Communalism Compared**

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Two worldwide trends over the past decade have been the ongoing spread of democracy over autocracy as a form of government, and the growing prominence of intrastate rather than interstate forms of violent conflict. Between them, these countervailing forces have defined world politics for much of the post-Cold War period. Beginning with the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal in 1974 and working its way through Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, what Samuel Huntington dubbed the ‘third wave’ of democracy has led to a threefold increase in the number of democracies around the globe. At the same time, however, the world has also witnessed a drastic change in the expression of large-scale conflict, towards internal violence, rather than the wars between states of the past.¹ As a consequence, democratization and internal conflict comprise two of the most important currents of political change in the contemporary world.

The reality of democratization in so many ethnically-diverse societies around the world has led to a renewed focus in both scholarly and policy worlds on the optimal democratic designs for ethnically-diverse societies. As third wave democracies drafted new constitutions and forged new political systems, there was a tremendous upsurge of interest in the possibilities of institutional engineering as a means of promoting the consolidation of democracy in post-conflict polities or fragile transitional states. Accompanying this was a change in the dynamics of international development assistance and the role of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. Spurred by the liberalization of previously autocratic states in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, the international community began to invest heavily in concepts of democracy promotion, electoral support and ‘good governance’ as essential elements of economic development and the creation of stable and peaceful states.

The 1990s thus saw an explosion of interest in issues of institutional design in new democracies, particularly those in which the international community was heavily invested. Developments which took decades and in some cases centuries in Western countries – such as a consolidated constitutional architecture, or an institutionalized political party system – were optimistically expected to be achieved in the space of a few short years. Scholars interested in the management of ethnic conflict advocated

overt ‘constitutional engineering’ as a means of promoting stable democracy in deeply divided societies.² This message has increasingly been echoed by policymakers as well, reflecting a growing consensus on the importance of political institutions and constitutional design.³

Amongst advocates, two contrasting approaches to political engineering for the management of social cleavages have dominated much of the academic literature. One is the scholarly orthodoxy of *consociationalism*, which relies on elite cooperation between leaders of different communities. Under this model, specific institutional measures – such as grand coalition cabinets, proportional representation elections, minority veto powers and communal autonomy – collectively maximize the independence and influence of each main ethnic community.

An alternative approach, sometimes typified as *centripetalism*, eschews consociational formulas and instead advocates institutions which encourage inter-communal moderation by promoting multiethnic political parties, cross-cutting electoral incentives, and inter-group accommodation. The former approach is based on the strategy of clarifying ethnic identities and “making plural societies more truly plural”,⁴ the latter on the opposite strategy of diluting the ethnic character of competitive politics and promoting multiethnic outcomes in its place.

A third approach, *communalism*, which uses explicit ethnic criteria of representation, has largely been abandoned as a political engineering strategy in most of the contemporary world but retains some vestigial support in a few post-colonial states.

This chapter looks at each of these models of political engineering for ethnically diverse societies in turn, focussing particularly on the key democratic institutions such as political parties, elections systems, and parliamentary representation.

Consociationalism

A basic typology of democratic systems begins with the distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies.⁵ Because majoritarian, ‘winner-take-all’ models can lead to ethnic minorities being denied parliamentary representation, it is often argued that such systems are unsuitable for ethnically-diverse societies. For example, simple majority rule of the type commonly found in Westminster parliamentary democracies when applied in an ethnically-bifurcated society can easily entrench one party or group’s dominance over all others. In divided societies, processes

of competitive democracy can, even with perfectly fair elections, result in a situation of permanent inclusion and exclusion for minorities. Because of this, institutional designs for plural societies often advocates the adoption of institutions and practices which encourage inter-ethnic balancing in public office, proportional representation of all significant cleavages in parliament, and sharing of power between these various segments in government. Consociationalism is the most established and developed of such models.⁶

Consociational prescriptions are based on the principle that each ethnic polity should enjoy a significant degree of autonomy and a right of veto over matters directly affecting the welfare of its members. Emphasising the need for elite cooperation if democracy is to survive in ethnically-cleaved societies, consociational agreements entail a balance of power within government between clearly defined social segments, brokered by identifiable ethnic leaders representing distinct social groups. Arend Lijphart, the scholar most associated with the consociational model, developed this prescription from a detailed examination of the features of power-sharing democracy in European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, and there is disagreement over the extent to which these measures can be applied to other regions. However, there is little doubt that consociationalism represents the dominant model of powersharing for “plural societies” – that is, in Lijphart’s terminology, “societies that are sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic or racial lines into virtually separate subsocieties with their own political parties, interest groups, and media of communication”.⁷ This definition points both to the European provenance of consociationalism, and to some of the inherent difficulties in applying this model to developing countries in other regions, which in many cases are not divided into ‘separate subsocieties’ but comprise more of an ethnic *mélange*, in which groups “mix but do not combine”.⁸

In terms of political engineering, consociationalists focus on core democratic institutions such as political parties, electoral systems, and cabinet governments, and on the territorial division of state powers via federalism. In each case, the focus is on defining and strengthening the autonomy of communal components of the society in question. In terms of political parties, for example, consociational approaches favour parties which represent social cleavages explicitly, via what Pippa Norris has characterized as “bonding” rather than “bridging” strategies – that is, parties which “focus upon gaining votes from a narrower home-base among particular segmented

sectors of the electorate”.⁹ The ideal form of party system for consociationalists is one based around clear social cleavages in which all significant groups, including minorities, can “define themselves” into ethnically-based political parties. Only by leading parties based around segmental cleavages, consociationalists contend, can political elites negotiate delicate ethnic issues effectively.¹⁰

To ensure the fair representation of such ethnic parties, consociational prescriptions invariably recommend proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, particularly party list systems which ensure a close parity between the proportion of the vote won by a party and its parliamentary representation by requiring electors to vote for a party’s chosen list of candidates. Lijphart, for instance, has consistently maintained that “the electoral system that is optimal for segmented societies is list PR”.¹¹ This contention is based on PR’s tendency to produce multi-party systems and hence multi-party parliaments in which all significant segments of the population can be clearly represented. Optimally, ‘closed’ party lists which do not enable voters to select individual candidates (thus strengthening the autonomy of party leaders) combined with large multi-member electoral districts (to maximize proportionality of outcomes), are favoured. Majoritarian systems, by contrast, are seen as “deeply flawed and dangerous”.¹²

In addition to PR, consociationalism also advocates ‘grand coalition’ governments, in which all significant parties are given a share of executive power, and in which minorities have the right of veto over important issues directly affecting their own communities. Lijphart has described South Africa’s interim 1994 constitution, which featured a formal requirement that all parties with at least five percent of seats in the legislature be offered commensurate positions in the cabinet, as “close to the optimal power-sharing system that could have been devised”.¹³ Other prominent examples of mandated grand coalition cabinets in recent years include the 1995 Dayton Accord in Bosnia, the 1998 Northern Ireland Good Friday agreement, and the 2000 Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi, amongst others.¹⁴

Despite its enduring appeal, recent years have seen something of a re-assessment of the empirical record of consociationalism in the scholarly literature. Recent edited volumes by Roeder and Rothchild¹⁵ and by Jarstad and Sisk¹⁶ have raised pointed questions about the claims made by advocates of power-sharing in general and consociational models in particular. Other large-N studies have found limited support for consociational expectations that greater minority representation leads to greater support

for democracy.¹⁷ Nonetheless, power-sharing and PR remains a de facto norm for United Nations-administered elections, as the cases of Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1990), Cambodia (1993), Mozambique (1994), Bosnia (1996), Kosovo (2001), East Timor (2001), and most recently Iraq (2005).¹⁸

Centripetalism

An alternative prescription for divided societies to that of consociationalism is what has been called *centripetalism* – so called “because the explicit aim is to engineer a centripetal spin to the political system – to pull the parties towards moderate, compromising policies and to discover and reinforce the centre of a deeply divided political spectrum”.¹⁹ Centripetalism emphasizes the importance of institutions that can encourage cooperation, accommodation and integration across ethnic divides, and can thus work to break down the salience of ethnicity rather than fostering its representation institutionally. In direct opposition to consociational recommendations, centripetalists maintain that the best way to manage democracy in divided societies is not to simply replicate existing ethnic divisions in the legislature and other representative organs, but rather to *depoliticize* ethnicity by putting in place institutional incentives for cross-ethnic voting and to encourage a degree of accommodation between rival groups. Institutions which encourage parties and candidates to ‘pool votes’ across ethnic lines, centripetalists contend, can promote cooperative outcomes and, in so doing, take the heat out of ethnic politics.²⁰

In an earlier book on electoral engineering for divided societies, I defined centripetalism as a shorthand for a political system or strategy designed to focus competition at the moderate centre rather than the extremes, and identified three facilitating components:

- (i) the presentation of *electoral incentives* for campaigning politicians to reach out to and attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own, thus encouraging candidates to moderate their political rhetoric on potentially divisive issues and forcing them to broaden their policy positions;
- (ii) the presence of multiethnic *arenas of bargaining* such as parliamentary and executive forums, in which political actors from different groups have an incentive to come together and cut deals on reciprocal electoral support, and hence perhaps on other more substantial policy issues as well; and

- (iii) the development of *centrist, aggregative and multiethnic political parties* or coalitions of parties which are capable of making cross-ethnic appeals and presenting a complex and diverse range of policy options to the electorate.²¹

Like consociationalism, centripetal proposals for conflict management focus on parties, elections, and parliaments as the institutions which offer the most potential for effective political engineering. However, the specific institutional recommendations made by centripetalists often run sharply counter to those of consociationalists. For instance, rather than focussing on the fair representation of ethnically-defined political parties, centripetalists place a premium on promoting multiethnic parties and cross-ethnic activity. This means that, in contrast to the consociational focus on proportional elections, centripetal approaches favour an aggregative majoritarianism, with more emphasis on the *process* by which different groups work together than strict fairness of *outcomes*. They argue that if the rules of the game are structured so as to reward cooperative political strategies with electoral success, office-seeking candidates representing competing interests will respond to electoral incentives to negotiate across ethnic lines for reciprocal support.

How can such cooperative behaviour be encouraged in divided societies, where cooperation across social cleavages is, by definition, lacking? One approach is to use institutions that enable or require cross-ethnic deal-making and accommodative behaviour between competing groups and their representatives. Centripetalists advocate electoral arrangements that make politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their own, and present campaigning politicians with incentives to court voter support across ethnic lines. To achieve this, electoral processes can be structured so as to require successful candidates to gain support across different regions of a country, thus helping to break down the appeal of narrow parochialism or regionalism. The ‘distribution requirement’ introduced for the 2004 presidential elections in Indonesia, where candidates had to gain at least 20 percent of the vote in 16 provinces in the first round of elections to avoid a runoff, is an example of such a system.

A more direct and more powerful centripetal approach to electoral system design is to use preferential, rank-order electoral systems such as the alternative vote, which require voters to declare not only their first choice of candidate, but also their second, third and subsequent choices amongst all candidates standing. If no-one gains an outright majority, these votes are transferred according to their rankings in order to elect a

majority-supported winner. Because they make politicians from different parties reciprocally dependent on preference transfers from their rivals, such systems present candidates who wish to maximize their electoral prospects with an incentive to try to attract secondary preference votes from other groups, so as to ensure the broadest possible range of support for their candidacy. The ethnically-divided Pacific states of Papua New Guinea and Fiji have both adopted such systems in recent years, although the PNG experience appears to have been more successful than Fiji's.²²

Other approaches attempt to undercut the logic of ethnic politics by requiring political parties to present ethnically-mixed slates of candidates for 'at-large' elections, thus making voter choice contingent upon issues *other* than ethnicity. In cases as diverse as Singapore, Lebanon and Djibouti, electoral laws require parties to include ethnic minorities on their lists of candidates in multi-member districts, meaning that some degree of cross-ethnic voting is mandated by the electoral system. However, these kinds of stipulations are often more tokenistic than substantive. In Singapore, for instance, parties and alliances contesting the 14 multimember districts designated as 'Group Representation Constituencies' must include candidates from designated ethnic minorities on their ticket – an arrangement which requires only a minimal degree of cross-ethnic voting, while guaranteeing that at least nine of the 93 seats in the Singaporean parliament will be occupied by Malays, and five by Indians or other minorities.

Just as their recommendations regarding electoral systems differ another important distinction between consociational and centripetal approaches to conflict management is their contrasting recommendations regarding political parties. As noted above, consociational prescriptions advocate the presence of ethnically-based parties and party systems, and see a virtue in having a multiplicity of parties representing all significant social groups. By contrast, centripetalists ideally favour an aggregative party system, in which "one or two broadly-based, centrist parties fight for the middle ground",²³ and therefore endorse the development of multiethnic parties or coalitions. Over time, it is argued, the presence of such party constellations can serve to depoliticize social cleavages and foster more fluid, cross-cutting affiliations. Efforts to foster aggregative and centrist political parties and broad-based coalition governments, while actively discouraging sectional or minority groups from forging their own parties, have been a distinctive feature of democratization in some conflict-prone states in Asia and Latin America.²⁴

The distinction between “bridging” and “bonding” political parties is again important here. Classically, political scientists have believed that majoritarian electoral rules will, over time, encourage the development of two large, aggregative parties.²⁵ This reductionist tendency occurs through a combination of ‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ electoral system effects. Mechanically, because they award seats on the basis of individual ‘winner-take-all’ contests in single-member districts, majoritarian elections tend to over-represent large parties and under-represent small ones, particularly those with a dispersed share of the vote. This tendency is compounded by the psychological impact of this process on voters, many of whom choose not to ‘waste’ their vote on a minor party but instead switch their support to one with a reasonable chance of success. The cumulative effect of these mechanical and psychological factors is to systematically advantage large parties and discriminate against small ones. The payoff for this discrimination is, in theory, more decisive and effective government, characterized by stable, responsible and predictable majority rule.

A separate theoretical approach, derived from basic game theory, argues that the presence of two parties competing for office should promote a convergence towards the political centre, thus helping avoid ideological and other kinds of polarization. Anthony Downs famously showed that under plurality electoral rules and a unidimensional (eg left-right) policy spectrum, the winning strategy will focus on the ‘median voter’ who has an equal number of fellow voters to both the left and the right.²⁶ In a two-party system, the most successful parties will therefore be those that command the middle ground. As a consequence, office-seeking candidates in such systems need to adopt moderate policies that appeal to the broadest possible array of interests, avoiding extreme positions and focussing instead on widely-shared demands: for example, the need for economic growth, competent bureaucracy, clean government and so on. Thus, in theory, majoritarian elections and two-party systems should produce centripetal politics focussed on the political centre. While critics argue that supporting evidence for this is thin, a number of comparative studies have found an association between more majoritarian electoral laws and weaker cleavage politics across both emerging and established democracies.²⁷

The formation of governing coalitions is another area of contrast between consociational and centripetal approaches. Just as consociationalists advocate the formation of inclusive executive governments, centripetalists argue that multiethnic coalitions are a near-essential element of conflict management for divided societies. But

while both favour executive powersharing underpinned by multiethnic coalition governments, again there is disagreement on the optimal application of these models. As noted earlier, consociationalists advocate ‘grand coalitions’ in which all significant parties (and hence ethnic groups) are included in the cabinet – if necessary, by constitutional fiat, such as the mandatory powersharing provisions discussed earlier. Centripetalists, by contrast, see grand coalitions as being only weakly harnessed to political incentives, and hence prone to falling apart when contentious decisions affecting group interests have to be taken. Truly multiethnic parties or coalitions of parties founded on common interests and vote-pooling electoral arrangements are, they contend, more likely to endure than forced cooperation between erstwhile enemies. Thus Donald L. Horowitz, a prominent supporter of centripetalsim, favours pre-election pacts or multiethnic coalitions to build enduring “coalitions of commitment” in government, as opposed to the weak and tenuous “coalitions of convenience” which characterize post-election grand coalitions.²⁸

Consociationalism assumes that enlightened elites will not just represent the interests of their own communities but will also act moderately towards their rivals, thus becoming a driving force for inter-ethnic moderation in divided societies. By contrast, centripetalism places less faith in elite moderation – a contention based on the evidence that elites, not ordinary voters, tend to be the main drivers of political extremism and democratic breakdown.²⁹ For centripetalists, communal moderation is more dependent on the behaviour of campaigning politicians and their supporters on the ground, and it is assumed that voters will follow the lead of their political leaders and pool votes across ethnic lines when asked to. The willingness of Chinese voters to support ethnically Malay candidates as part of the ruling multiethnic coalition in Malaysia is often cited as an example of this kind of ‘vote-pooling’ in action.³⁰ More generally, whereas consociational prescriptions are seen as relying predominantly on constraints (such as minority vetoes) against hostility, the centripetal approach focuses on the need for incentives to motivate accommodative behaviour via the search for secondary support. This further distinguishes the centripetal model from that of consociationalism.

A final important area of contrast concerns territorial recommendations such as federalism, devolution and autonomy. The competing logics of consociational and centripetal approaches to conflict management mean that ethnic federalism is the natural choice for consociationalists, as already noted. The cross-ethnic logic of centripetalism, by contrast, suggests that a unitary state or non-ethnic federal units would be a more

appropriate choice, given the centripetal focus on multiethnicity as the key to conflict management.

Like consociationalism, centripetalism has attracted significant criticism on both empirical and conceptual grounds. Empirically, critics point to the paucity of centripetal models in the real world; the limited application of cross-voting electoral systems, distribution requirements and other favoured devices; the difficulty in both forming and sustaining multiethnic political parties and coalitions in divided societies; and the ambiguous real-world experience of particular institutions such as the alternative vote.³¹ Conceptually, centripetalism is also criticized for being essentially majoritarian in nature. As the logic of centripetalism is focussed above all on the potential benefits of *aggregation* – of votes, of opinions, of parties – at one level, this is correct. G. Bingham Powell, for example, notes that political aggregation lies at the heart of what he calls the ‘majoritarian vision’ of democracy: “the majoritarian view favours much greater aggregation, while the proportional view emphasizes the importance of equitable reflection of all points of view into the legislature”.³² For this reason, critics of centripetalism have often identified the majoritarian nature of its institutional recommendations as a key weakness.³³ Centripetalists respond that they favour “a majoritarian democracy that will produce more fluid, shifting majorities that do not lock ascriptive minorities firmly out of power”.³⁴ In other words, while centripetalism is indeed a majoritarian model, it is a majoritarianism of broad-based parties and inclusive coalitions – not a majoritarianism of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, of ethnically-defined majorities and minorities.

Interestingly, the majoritarian themes of the centripetal approach and their emphasis on aggregative, ‘bridging’ political parties are echoed by and find support in a quite separate scholarly literature, on the political economy of development. Both literatures, for example, advocate aggregative political institutions, majoritarian electoral processes and broad-based ‘catch-all’ parties or coalitions. These same recommendations are also prominent in the ‘developmental state’ literature on the optimum political arrangements for economic development in new democracies. Thus, various works co-authored by Stephan Haggard have consistently argued that a system of two large parties or coalitions is the most propitious arrangement for democratic durability during periods of economic adjustment, while fragmented or polarized party systems represent a major barrier to achieving economic reform.³⁵ Such recommendations suggest a growing

convergence amongst different political science sub-disciplines on the benefits of aggregative and centripetal institutions for political development and stability.

Communalism

A third approach to building stable democracy in ethnically divided societies is to explicitly recognize the importance of group identity in politics by making social cleavages a fundamental building block of the entire political system – for example, by ensuring that ethnic representation and ratios are pre-set according to explicit communal criteria in the electoral system, the parliament, and other key institutions. Under such schemes, legislative seats are often allocated on a communal basis, and in some cases the entire political system is based upon communal considerations – distinguishing it from the ‘self-determined’ model of ethnic representation favoured by consociationalists.³⁶ Lebanon’s ‘confessional’ political system, in which parliamentary seats are equally divided between Christian and Muslim members, with key executive offices such as the president and prime minister also allocated on a sectarian basis, is perhaps the best-known example of a communal political system. Fiji is another: there, two-thirds of all parliamentary seats are reserved for members of the country’s three main ethnic communities (Fijians have 23 seats, Indo-Fijians have 19 seats, there are three seats for ‘general electors’ and one for the distant island of Rotuma).

A related approach is to explicitly *reserve* some seats so as to ensure the legislative representation of specific communal groups: for instance, New Zealand and Taiwan both reserve seats for their indigenous population, who also have the option of enrolling on their own separate voters roll. Other communal schemes allow reserved seats to be elected by all voters in much the same manner as other members of parliament. In India, for example, one-fifth of parliamentary seats are reserved for scheduled tribes and castes – but without a separate voters roll. In the same vein, many Central and East European democracies similarly reserve a small number of parliamentary seats for minorities. While none of these are communal systems, each contain elements of communalism via the reservation of seats for specific minorities.³⁷

While retaining a foothold in some regions, communalism has faded in popularity since its heyday in earlier periods of colonial rule, when such schemes were often introduced in early representative bodies under British colonialism in Asia and Africa. There are several reasons for this disenchantment with communalism. A core problem is that communal schemes inevitably require some official recognition and determination of

group identity. As well as creating real moral dilemmas, this official designation of ethnicity assumes that ethnic identities are immutable and enduring, and thus can contribute to the solidification of ethnic politics rather than its breakdown. Because of this, communal systems tend to suffer from a distinct lack of flexibility: changes in the proportions of ethnic groups present in the community are not reflected in the larger political system, which is effectively frozen in time from whenever the original determinations of group proportions were made. Finally, communalism by its nature militates against political integration: it is exceptionally difficult to establish national political parties, for example, under a system of communal representation.³⁸

In terms of the broader political engineering debates, communal approaches are clearly more consistent with consociationalism than they are with centripetalism. Communally-based parties and electoral systems, for instance, tend to be incompatible with centripetalism, as they require a formal identification of ethnicity and can thus contribute to the consolidation of ethnic politics rather than its breakdown. Nonetheless, cases such as Lebanon and Fiji can be seen as representing mixtures of both centripetal and communal approaches, as in each case their electoral systems encourage cross-ethnic voting in the context of pre-determined ratios of ethnic representation. But communalism clearly has stronger links with consociationalism: as long as communal seats are distributed proportionately, communal rolls and other devices which explicitly recognize ethnic identity are, as Lijphart has noted, entirely consistent with consociational approaches.³⁹

Conclusion

In practice, the three political engineering models of consociationalism, centripetalism and communalism should probably be seen more as ideal types rather than coherent, all-encompassing prescriptions. Indeed, many countries use combinations of each approach. Table 1 sets out the key recommendations of each approach.

Table 1: Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Communalism Compared

	Consociationalism	Centripetalism	Communalism
Elections	List PR lists in large districts to maximize proportional outcomes	Vote-pooling to make politicians dependent on communities other than their own.	Communal electoral rolls; sectarian division of parliament
Parties	Ethnic parties each representing their own ethnic group	Non-ethnic or multiethnic parties or party coalitions	Ethnic parties for communal element of elections.
Cabinets	Grand coalition governments; minority veto on important issues	Multiethnic coalition governments. No minority vetoes	Formal powersharing arrangements based on vote or seat share
Devolution	Segmental autonomy and ethnic federalism	Non-ethnic federalism or autonomy	Partition

Despite their differences, advocates of consociationalism, centripetalism and communalism nonetheless do find agreement on some broader issues. For instance, there is a general consensus on the capacity of political institutions to change political outcomes, and hence on the utility of political engineering. Common ground is also found in the central role ascribed to political parties and electoral systems as key institutional variables influencing the reduction – or escalation – of communal tensions in ethnically diverse societies. A third is the broad acceptance of the need in divided societies to deal with the political effects of ethnicity directly, rather than wishing them away. At a minimum, this means some type of government arrangement that gives all significant groups access to power, either directly or indirectly. For instance, multiethnic coalitions are favoured by both consociationalists and centripetalists as a desirable form of powersharing for divided societies.

The contemporary experience of these different approaches has varied depending on the severity of the conflicts at stake. In deeply-divided post-war scenarios such as Bosnia, Northern Ireland and most recently Iraq, consociationalism remains the dominant approach. However, this trend is partly driven by the United Nations' approach to post-conflict democratization, which favours on PR elections and power-sharing governments in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. Elsewhere, in less catastrophic cases, the trend in many regions seems to be away from the ethnically-based approach of consociationalism towards more fluid, centripetal models. Thus, there has been a marked shift away from consociational models in some regions, such as Asia, in favour of more centripetal institutions in recent years.⁴⁰

¹ Perhaps the best known exposition of this is Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

² See Donald L. Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1991).

³ For a policy-focused approach to these issues, see Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (eds), *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998).

⁴ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 42.

⁵ Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press, 1984).

⁶ There is a voluminous literature on consociationalism. Major works include Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1968); Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972); Kenneth McRae (ed), *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1974); Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*.

⁷ Lijphart, *Democracies*, 22.

⁸ J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 304.

⁹ Pippa Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10.

¹⁰ See Arend Lijphart, 'Self-determination Versus Pre-determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-sharing Systems' in Will Kymlicka (ed), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Similarly, consociationalists also favour ethnic federalism. As with political parties, a key presumption is that constituent units should be as ethnically homogeneous as possible in order to maximize each group's control over their own interests and resources.

¹¹ Arend Lijphart, 'Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Conflict Management in Segmented Societies' in R.A. Schreier (ed), *Critical Choices for South Africa: An Agenda for the 1990s* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990), 2, 13.

¹² Arend Lijphart, 'Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South Africa' in Andrew Reynolds (ed), *Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects* (Claremont: David Phillip Publishers, 1994), 224.

¹³ *Ibid*, 222.

¹⁴ See Anna K. Jarstad, 'Power sharing: former enemies in joint governments' in Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008).

¹⁵ Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds), *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2005).

¹⁶ Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008).

¹⁷ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, Chap 5.

¹⁸ I discuss this point in more detail in Benjamin Reilly, 'Elections in Post-Conflict Societies' in Edward Newman and Roland Rich (eds), *The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004).

¹⁹ See Timothy D. Sisk, *Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 19.

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- ²⁰ For surveys of these, see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 597-600.
- ²¹ Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11.
- ²² For a discussion, see Benjamin Reilly, 'Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific', *Journal of Democracy*, 18(1), 2007, pp. 58-72.
- ²³ Larry Diamond, 'Toward Democratic Consolidation' in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 239.
- ²⁴ See Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund (eds), *Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2008.
- ²⁵ The classic statement of this is Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (New York: Wiley, 1954).
- ²⁶ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
- ²⁷ See Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, Chapter Five.
- ²⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 365-95.
- ²⁹ See Nancy Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
- ³⁰ See Donald L. Horowitz, 'Making Moderation Pay: the Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management' in J.V. Montville (ed), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 464-7.
- ³¹ See Arend Lijphart, 'The Alternative Vote: A Realistic Alternative for South Africa?', *Politikon* 18:2 (1991), 91-101; Andrew Reynolds, 'Constitutional Engineering in Southern Africa', *Journal of Democracy* 6:2 (1995), 86-100; Jon Fraenkel, 'The Alternative Vote System in Fiji: Electoral Engineering or Ballot-Rigging?', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 39:1 (2001), 1-31; Arend Lijphart, 'Constitutional Design for Divided Societies', *Journal of Democracy* 15:2 (2004), 96-109; Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman, 'A neo-Downsian model of the alternative vote as a mechanism for mitigating ethnic conflict in plural societies', *Public Choice* 121 (2004), 487-506.
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- ³³ See, for example, Arend Lijphart, 'Multiethnic Democracy' in Seymour Martin Lipset (ed), *The Encyclopedia of Democracy* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), 863-4; Andrew Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 108-110.
- ³⁴ Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?*, 176.
- ³⁵ See Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, *Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Stephan Haggard and Robert

Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

³⁶ Lijphart, 'Self-determination Versus Pre-determination'.

³⁷ For a discussion of these, see Florian Bieber, 'Regulating minority parties in Central and South-Eastern Europe', in Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund (eds), *Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2008.

³⁸ See Ben Reilly and Andrew Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies* (Washington DC: National Research Council, 1999), 41.

³⁹ See Arend Lijphart, *Power Sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley CA: Policy Papers in International Affairs No. 24, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985), 25fn.

⁴⁰ See Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering for Conflict Management* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).